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Civil Court of the City of New York
County of Queens: Housing Part P
YINJIE ZHAO and KAREN YIN JUAN ZHAO,
Petitioner
QL&T# 300702-22

-againstDecision/Order
LEI ZHANG and HAORAN WAN
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE
Respondents.

The instant holdover proceeding seeks possession of the subject basement apartment.
Petitioners are represented by counsel. Respondent Zhang (hereinafter "Zhang") is represented
by Queens Legal Services. Respondent, Wan did not answer or appear and the trial is deemed
an inquest as to him.
Neither side contests that the subject apartment is an illegal occupancy and that no
rents or use and occupancy is owed. Rather, the issues for this proceeding are whether
Respondent, Zhang was constructively evicted and is entitled to damages and whether this
proceed ing was commenced in retaliation for Respondent asking for repairs.
The testimony from both sides showed that the impetus for these issues, defenses and
counterclaims is Hurricane Ida. The hurricane occurred on or about September 1, 2021. On that
date, New York City experienced unprecedented flooding in residences, particularly illegal
basement apartments. Immediately thereafter, Petitioners and Zhang met and discussed what
would happen next. In short, both sides agree that there was excessive flooding, rendering the
premises, at least temporarily, destroyed and uninhabitable. Petitioners informed Zhang they
wanted Respondents to move and would pay for them to surrender possession . Zhang testified
that Petitioners offered her $10,000.00 and she requested $20,000.00, because of
lost/destroyed personal property, though it appears that no amount was agreed upon and no
payment was ever made.
It is undisputed that a few days after Hurricane Ida, Zhang accepted temporary housing
assistance from the Red Cross in the form of a hotel room. On September 30, 2021, Zhang
signed a month-to-month lease for an apartment located in Elmhurst, NY commencing October
1, 2021. Zhang occupied the Elmhurst apartment through February 2022, when she returned to
the subject apartment. During that time, Petitioner issued a Notice of Termination mid-October
2021 identifying a vacatur date of January 14, 2022. Thereafter, the underlying Petition and
Notice of Petition Holdover was served at the beginning of February 2022.
CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION
A tenant is "constructively evicted" from a premises where the tenant leaves the
premises due to conditions that are dangerous to the tenant' s life, health and/or safety and
render said unit uninhabitable. NY Real Prop. Law §227. Constructive evictions ca n be total or
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partial. See Minjak Co. v. Randolph, 140 AD 2d 245, 528 NYS 2d 554 (1st Dep't . 1988) and Barash
v. Pennsylvania Termina l Real Estate Corp., 26 NY 2d 77, 308 NYS2d 649 (1970) If a tenant is
constructively evicted, in total or partially, the obligation to pay rent under a leasehold is
su spended. 542 East 14th St reet, LLC v. Moses, 38 Misc.3d 127(A), 967 NYS2d 866 (App Term
2012) However, vacatur due to the cond itions, is a requ irement . NYCHA v. Ramos, 41 M isc. 3d
702, 971 NYS 2d 422 (Civ. Kings 2013)
In the instant proceed ing, it is true that Hurricane Ida caused terrible conditions in the
subject apartment. Both sides agree that the subject apartment was "uninhabitable". After the
parties discussed her vacating in a "cash for keys" deal, but without agree ing to the amount of
the payment or receiving any monies, Zhang left the subject apartment soon after the
hurricane to accept Red Cross temporary housing. Zhang then left the temporary housing and
signed a lease to occupy a different apartment, which she did for approximately five months,
still w ithout agreeing on an amount to be paid by Petitioner for her surrender of the subject
apartment. It is unclear whether the " cash for keys" negotiations between the parties
continued during that time . At no time did Zhang surrender possession, leaving her belongings
and a rooster in the subject apartment. According to the testimony, Zhang returned to the
subject apartment regularly, if not daily. The record showed that she resumed residing in the
subject apartment, still w ithout any payment from Petitioner, because she accepted
employment closer to the subject apartment than the Elmhurst address.
The case law makes clear that the days immediately following Hurricane Ida should not
be considered supportive of a claim of constructive eviction. NYCHA v. Ramos, Id. This
exception to the statutorily mandated obligation to maintain the warranty of habitability stems
from a lack of "wrongdoing" by a landlord in the cases of severe weather. In that case the
Court relied on the definition of a constructive eviction, namely that to succeed in establishing
the defense, a tenant must show that the " landlord's wrongful acts substantially and materially
deprived the tenant of the beneficial use and enjoyment of the premises". See Barash v.
Pennsylvania Terminal Real Estate Corp., supra . Also required is that the tenant actually
abandon all or a part of the property. Here, Zhang did not abandon the subject property
because of the conditions. Rather, she vacated because she thought Petitioners were going to
pay her a lot of money to not reside there anymore and give up her possessory interest in the
apartment. Given the conditions that Hurricane Ida had caused, and t he potentia l of a financial
windfall, it is clear that Zhang chose not to wait for the conditions to be addressed.
In the instant proceeding, it is the passage of time that could create a "wrong-doing" by
a landlord in not addressing the conditions. As Zhang points out, in NYCHA v. Ramos, Hurricane
Sandy had caused that Respondent to have no elevator and other services for five (5) weeks.
This Court agrees that while the immediate time after the natural disaster should not be
charged to a landlord, the failure to address said concerns after a reasonable period of time
could give rise to a claim of constructive eviction. However, in this proceeding, there was little
in terms of the passage of time before Zhang took occupancy in another apartment.
Zhang's constructive eviction claim fails for another reason. She is adamant that
Petitioners made no repairs to the subject apartment in the six months between Hurricane Ida
and her return to the subject apartment. Yet, to this Court's knowledge, Respondent occupied
the subject apartment from February 2022 to the date of trial (August 1, 2022) and is occupying
the subject apartment as of the writing of this decision/order. The Court must wonder how
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Zhang continues to occupy the subject apartment, without any repairs having been made, and
still claim there was a constructive eviction. If vacating is a prerequisite, Zhang's decision to
return to the subject apartment even though no repa irs were made, precludes her from
asserting she was constructively evicted. It may be that if repairs were made, changing the
condition of the subject apartment, and then Zhang returned to possession, a temporary,
constructive eviction could be found. However, this Court places more credence on Zhang's
testimony that obtaining a new job, very far from the apartment in Elmhurst and being
outraged over Petitioners seeking to evict her, precipitated her return.
RETALIATORY EVICTION
RPL §223-b prohibits a landlord from serving a termination notice or commence any
action or summary proceeding to recover real property in reta liation for, amongst other things,
the tenant making a good faith complaint to the landlord or to an agency. This provision was
written to make the mere complaint and demand for repair to a landlord a basis for a defense
to any subsequent eviction proceeding commenced within a year of the complaint. In other
words, there is a very low bar to provide a tenant with a rebuttable presumption that any and
every proceeding is commenced because a repair was sought. Thus, it is the tenant's burden to
establish that a complaint and demand for repairs was made to a landlord or its agent.
Zhang's testimony had very little related to demanding Petitioners repair the subject
apartment. Instead, her testimony was that she called Petitioner when the rain was coming into
the apartment and that she met one of the la ndlords at the premises the next day. At that time
the landlord said there was too much damage and that Zhang would have to move out.
Presumably at that time, there was an implicit, if not actual, request for repairs . According to
Zhang, two or three days later, the landlord offered her $10,000.00 to move out and she
countered with $20,000.00. If th e subject premises was not in the terrible condition that both
sides agree it was, there would be little reason for a monetary offer to vacate.
Zhang testified that she agreed to vacate the subject apartment quickly to get the
money. Zhang contacted the Red Cross for temporary housing in a hotel. After staying there for
a month, Zhang entered into a lease for a different premises and remained residing there for
five months. However, it seems clear that no monies were paid to Zhang and no keys to the
subject apartment were returned to Petitioners. According to Zhang, this was because an
inspector came to the premises to observe the conditions. According to the testimony, this
occurred in September 2021. Zhang's testimony was that one of the landlord's told her she
would not get paid because they believed Zhang requested the inspection.
Since the instant proceeding was commenced within a year of Zhang complaining about
the condition of the subject apartment, and an inspection occurring, the Court must start with
the rebuttable presumption that the instant proceeding was commenced in retaliation for
Zhang seeking repairs. The question is whether or not Petitioners have rebutted that
presumption. This Court must conclude that Petitioners did not rebut the presumption.
Petitioners offered no reason why this proceeding was commenced at the time that it was.
Nothing occurred prior to the service of the notice of termination that could be identified as a
basis for the instant proceeding. Rather, it seems clear that since Zhang's continued occupancy
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would force Petitioners to repair the subj ect apartment, the instant proceeding was
commenced.
That they wanted Zhang to move instead of repairing the subject apartment was clear.
Steps were taken to cause Zhang to vacate but they were not completed. Petitioners claim that
they did not pay because Zhang did not move out. Yet, it is clear that Zhang took more steps
towards completing her part of the deal than Petitioners did. Petitioners never agreed on an
amount with Zhang nor did they make is clear that they were prepared to make a payment, so
how and why would she have moved out? It seems that Petitioners expected Zhang to rely on
their representation of payment, move out and then hope she was paid. When this did not
occur, Petitioners commenced this proceeding.
Both sides agree an inspector came to the premises. Given that the subject apartment is
an illegal basement apartment, this could not have made Petitioners happy. If anything, the
inspector's presence does provide some credence to Zhang's position.
CONCLUSION
Based on t he foregoing, the Court finds that Zhang failed to prove the defense of
constructive eviction. The Court further finds that Petitioners did not rebut the presumption
that the instant proceeding was commenced in retaliation for Zhang seeking repairs or, in the
alternative, a payment to vacate as offered by Pet itioners.
The instant proceeding is dismissed. The dismissal is without prejudice to Zhang
commencing an HP proceeding. The Court declines to issue an order to correct given that
Hurricane Ida occurred a year ago and there is nothing to establish the current condit ion of the
premises given that Zhang has resided there for t he last six months.
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.
Dated: Queens, New York
September 6, 2022

JOHNS.

4 of 4

